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Abstract. NTRUEncrypt is a fast and standardized lattice-based public
key encryption scheme, but it lacks a proof of security. Stehle´ and Stein-
feld (EUROCRYPT 2011) first gave a variant of NTRUEncrypt, denoted
by pNE, over power-of-2 cyclotomic rings. The pNE scheme is provably
secure assuming the hardness of worst-case problems over ideal lattices.
Recently, Yu, Xu and Wang (PKC 2017) proposed a pNE variant over
prime cyclotomic rings, but it requires the parameters to be of rather
larger sizes. In this paper, working with canonical embedding, we mo-
dify the key generation algorithm of pNE scheme to make it applicable to
general cyclotomic rings. Through an improved analysis, we provide tig-
hter parameters of pNE over prime power cyclotomic rings. To be more
specific, even for the general case, our parameters are as good as that
obtained by Stehle´ and Steinfeld for the case of power-of-2; compared
to that of Yu, Xu and Wang (PKC 2017), the sizes of our parameters
get significantly reduced. Thus our result not only applies to a larger
class of rings but also enjoys greater efficiency. In proving our results, we
have developed some technical tools which may be of general interest.
Some remarks on further extension of the work (e.g., for more general
polynomial rings) have also been made.
1 Introduction
NTRU, introduced by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman in [25], is a celebrated pu-
blic key cryptosystem standardized by IEEE. Its encryption scheme, NTRUEncrypt,
is one of the fastest known lattice-based encryption schemes. Due to its excellent
performance and potential resistance to quantum computers, NTRUEncrypt is
considered as not only a desirable alternative to classical schemes based on in-
teger factorisation or discrete logarithms but also a promising post-quantum
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encryption scheme. Based on the underlying problem of NTRU, various crypto-
graphic primitives are designed, including digital signature [24, 15], identity-
based encryption [17], fully homomorphic encryption [31, 7] and multilinear
maps [20, 30]. In the last 20 years, a batch of cryptanalysis works [12, 27, 21, 36,
19, 26, 18, 3, 9, 28] were proposed aiming at NTRU family, and NTRUEncrypt is
generally believed to be secure in practice. However, classical NTRU lacks a solid
security guarantee, which may weaken our confidence in this scheme.
Over the past decade, many provably secure lattice-based schemes have been
established based on well-studied lattice problems. A very important problem
is the Learning With Errors problem (LWE), introduced by Regev [39]. The
average-case LWE is shown to be as hard as certain worst-case lattice problems,
which is a main attraction of LWE. To obtain better compactness and efficiency,
several algebraic variants of LWE were proposed, such as Ring-LWE [32] (RLWE)
and Module-LWE [29]. The hardness of these variants is based on some worst-
case problems over structured lattices. Some practical applications [4, 16, 6] have
been designed based on LWE variants.
In 2011, Stehle´ and Steinfeld first proposed a provably secure variant of
NTRUEncrypt [40] that we denote by pNE, and gave a reduction from RLWE
to the IND-CPA security (indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack) of
pNE. This provides the first theoretical grounding for the security of NTRU in the
asymptotic sense. Then, a variant of pNE against chosen-ciphertext attacks [42]
and a provably secure NTRU signature scheme [41] were proposed successively.
These modified NTRU schemes are restricted to power-of-2 cyclotomic rings,
i.e. Z[X]/(X2k+1), that are scarce. Recently, Yu, Xu and Wang modified pNE to
make it work over prime cyclotomic rings, i.e. Z[X]/(Xn−1 + · · · + 1) with n
a prime, in [44], which allows more flexibility of parameter selections. However,
due to different ring structures and the possibly rough parameter estimation,
the parameters of pNE over prime cyclotomic rings are much larger than that of
pNE over power-of-2 cyclotomic rings.
Compared with classical NTRU, provably secure NTRU keeps the same asymp-
totic efficiency but enjoys a firm theoretical security as well. While pNE is much
less practical [8], it shows an important connection between NTRU and RLWE,
and between problems over NTRU lattices and worst-case problems over ideal
lattices. With the recent calls for post-quantum cryptography by NIST, a better
understanding of these problems is necessary and thus the study of pNE would
be of theoretical value. An essential issue to be addressed is the choice of the
underlying ring for pNE, which is the main motivation of our paper.
Contribution In this paper, we study a new variant of pNE over cyclotomic rings
and show that, given appropriate parameters, provably secure NTRU can hold
over prime power cyclotomic rings and even more general rings. The key gene-
ration algorithm of our pNE is modified and relies on Gaussian sampling with
respect to canonical embedding instead of coefficient embedding. We show that
the public key, i.e. the ratio of two secret polynomials, will be almost uniformly
distributed, if the secret polynomials are sampled from certain Gaussians. This is
a remarkable property of pNE originally proposed by Stehle´ and Steinfeld in [40].
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It is worth noting that the “uniformity” of public key holds not only for the case
of prime power, but also for general cyclotomic rings.
For a tighter parameter estimation, we develop some new tools. On the one
hand, we propose a new discrete Gaussian tail inequality measuring the Eucli-
dean norm of f where f follows a Gaussian with respect to canonical embedding.
A main technique is to consider all singular values of the canonical embedding
transformation matrix that profile the geometry of the underlying ring. A si-
milar idea was exploited in the tail inequality given in [2], but its tail bound
only involves the smallest singular value. Hence our tail bound can be tighter
than that in [2] for certain cases as it will be shown in later discussion. On the
other hand, we show a series of general results on cyclotomic rings and some
special properties of prime power cyclotomic rings. Even though similar results
on power-of-2 and prime cyclotomic rings have been established in [40, 44], in
this paper we mainly consider these results with respect to canonical embedding
rather than coefficient embedding. Thus many technical differences still need
to be treated carefully. Exploiting all of these tools, we provide asymptotical
parameters of pNE over prime power cyclotomic rings. The parameters of our
scheme are improved (see Table 1) in that they have essentially the same sizes
as that in the power-of-2 case from [40]. This also means that our parameter
sizes are significantly reduced compared with that in [44]. Therefore, our result
further enriches the provably secure NTRU family and allows more flexible and
compact parameters. Our result also suggests that cryptographic applications
over prime power cyclotomic rings are likely to achieve similar efficiency to that
over power-of-2 cyclotomic rings.
Table 1. Parameters of provably secure NTRU.
Scheme Type of n Ring density Modulus q Euclidean length of key
SS11 [40] power-of-2 Θ( logN
N
) Ω˜(n4.5) O˜(n1.5q0.5)
YXW17 [44] prime Θ( 1
logN
) Ω˜(n7.5) O˜(n2.5q0.5)
This work prime power Θ( 1
logN
) Ω˜(n4.5) O˜(n1.5q0.5)
Furthermore, a generalization of the above discussion to other rings is consi-
dered. With certain polynomial P (X) and certain prime number q, a similar re-
gularity result can be proved and thus we may construct pNE over Z[X]/(P (X)).
We also point out several attributes of P (X) concerning parameter selections.
Even though some factors may not be taken into account, our discussion can
still be helpful to choose a suitable ring for cryptosystems.
Organization In Sect. 2, we introduce some notations and basic results that
will be used in our discussion. In Sect. 3, we present two discrete Gaussian tail
inequalities. In Sect. 4, we show a series of relevant results over general cyclotomic
rings and several special properties of prime power cyclotomic rings. Then, we
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describe our pNE variant over prime power cyclotomic rings and demonstrate
parameter requirements in Sect. 5. Finally, we further discuss a generalization
to some other rings in Sect. 6.
2 Preliminaries
Embeddings and Norms Let P (X) ∈ Z[X] be a monic irreducible polynomial
of degree n and K = Q[X]/(P (X)). For any t =
∑n−1
i=0 tiX
i ∈ K, the vector
(t0, · · · , tn−1) ∈ Qn is called the coefficient vector of t. The coefficient embedding
maps any element ofK to its coefficient vector. We denote by ‖t‖ (resp. ‖t‖∞) the
Euclidean (resp. `∞) norm of the coefficient vector of t. For t = (t(1), · · · , t(m)) ∈
Km, its Euclidean norm (under coefficient embedding) is ‖t‖ =
√∑
i ‖t(i)‖2 and
its `∞ norm is ‖t‖∞ = maxi ‖t(i)‖∞. Note that, for a = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ Cn, we
also denote by ‖a‖ = √∑i |ai|2 its Euclidean norm and by ‖a‖∞ = maxi |ai|
its `∞ norm.
Besides coefficient embedding, canonical embedding is also very important,
especially in the context of RLWE [32, 33]. Assume that P (X) has s1 real
roots denoted by ω1, · · · , ωs1 , and 2s2 complex conjugate roots denoted by
ωs1+1, · · · , ωs1+2s2 where ωs1+k = ωs1+k+s2 for k ∈ {1, · · · , s2}. The field K
has exactly n embeddings into C denoted by σi : K → C where σi(t) =
t(ωi) for any t ∈ K. Then the canonical embedding σ : K → Cn is defi-
ned as σ(t) = (σ1(t), · · · , σn(t)). Viewing t as its coefficient vector, we have
σ(t) = t · V where V = (ωi−1j )1≤i,j≤n and is called the canonical embed-
ding transformation. In fact, the canonical embedding maps into the space
H = {(x1, · · · , xn) | x1, · · · , xs1 ∈ R, xs1+k = xs1+k+s2 , 1 ≤ k ≤ s2} iso-
morphic to Rn as an inner product space, and the inner product 〈σ(s), σ(t)〉
equals
∑
i σi(s)σi(t) = Tr(st), i.e. the trace of st over Q. The T2-norm of t is
T2(t) = ‖σ(t)‖ =
√∑
i |σi(t)|2, the T∞-norm of t is T∞(t) = ‖σ(t)‖∞ and the
algebraic norm is N(t) =
∏
i |σi(t)|. For t = (t1, · · · , tm) ∈ Km, the T2-norm of
t is T2(t) =
√∑
i T2(ti)
2 and the T∞-norm of t is T∞(t) = maxi T∞(ti).
Lattice A full-rank lattice is the set of all integer linear combinations of linearly
independent vectors b1, · · · ,bn in an n-dimensional inner product space V 5. We
call (b1, · · · ,bn) a basis and n the dimension of the lattice. Let B be a basis of a
lattice L, then the volume of L is vol(L) = √det(G(B)) where G(B) is the Gram
matrix of B. The dual lattice of L is the lattice L̂ = {c ∈ V | ∀i, 〈c,bi〉 ∈ Z}6.
The first minimum λ1(L) (resp. λ∞1 (L)) is the minimum of Euclidean (resp. `∞)
norm of all non-zero vectors of L. More generally, for k ≤ n, the k-th minimum
5 For coefficient embedding and canonical embedding, the space V corresponds to Rn
and H respectively.
6 Actually, the dual lattice that we define is the complex conjugate of that as usually
defined in Cn, but all properties of the dual lattice used in this paper hold for the
conjugate dual as well.
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λk(L) is the smallest r such that there are at least k linearly independent vectors
of L whose norms are not greater than r.
Let R be the ring of integers of a field K with an additive isomorphism θ7
mappingR to the lattice θ(R). Let I be an ideal ofR, then θ(I) is an ideal lattice.
The norm of an ideal I is N(I) = |R/I|. For any t ∈ R, we have N(〈t〉) = N(t)
where 〈t〉 = tR.
By restricting SVP(Shortest Vector Problem) and γ-SVP(Approximate Shor-
test Vector Problem with approximation factor γ) to ideal lattices, we get Ideal-
SVP and γ-Ideal-SVP. These ideal lattice problems do not seem to be substan-
tially easier than the versions for general lattice (perhaps, except for very large
γ [13]). Currently, it is believed that the worst-case hardness of γ-Ideal-SVP is
against subexponential quantum attacks, for any γ ≤ poly(n).
Probability and Statistics For a distribution D over a domain E, we write z ←↩
D when the random variable z is sampled from D, and denote by D(x) the
probability of z = x. If the domain E is a finite set, we use U(E) to denote the
uniform distribution over E. For two distributions D1, D2 over the same discrete
domain E, their statistical distance is ∆(D1;D2) =
1
2
∑
x∈E |D1(x)−D2(x)|. If
∆(D1;D2) = o(n
−c) for any constant c > 0, then we call D1, D2 statistically
close with respect to n.
Cyclotomic Ring Let ξn be a primitive n-th root of unity. The n-th cyclotomic
polynomial, denoted by Φn(X), is the minimal polynomial of ξn. It is known
that Φn(X) =
∏
i∈Z∗n(X − ξin) ∈ Z[X]. Each cyclotomic polynomial Φn(X)
corresponds to a binomial Θn(X) defined as X
n − 1 if n is odd and Xn/2 + 1
if n is even, and Θn(X) is a multiple of Φn(X). A cyclotomic ring is a quotient
ring of the form R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)). For some special n, the form of Φn(X) is
regular and simple. If n is a prime, we have Φn(X) = X
n−1 + Xn−2 + · · · + 1.
More generally, if n = dν is a power of prime d, we have Φn(X) = Φd(X
dν−1)
and call it a prime power cyclotomic ring.
If a prime q satisfies q = 1 mod n, then Φn(X) splits completely into distinct
linear factors modulo q. Given n, according to Dirichlet’s theorem on arithmetic
progressions, there exist infinitely many primes congruent to 1 modulo n. Furt-
hermore, Linnik’s theorem asserts that the smallest such q is of size poly(n) (a
concrete bound is O(n5.2), see [43]).
Gaussian Measures Let ρr,c(x) = exp
(−pi‖x− c‖2/r2) be the n-dimensional
Gaussian function with center c ∈ V and width r. When c = 0, the Gaus-
sian function is written as ρr(x). We denote by ψr the (continuous) Gaus-
sian distribution over R with mean 0 and width r whose probability density
function is ρr(x)/r. Let ψ
n
r be the spherical Gaussian distribution over Rn of
the vector (v1, · · · , vn) where all vi’s follow ψr independently. We can restrict ψr
over Q so that ψn′r can be viewed as a distribution over Q[X]/(Θn(X)) where
n′ = deg(Θn(X)), which only leads to a negligible impact on our results, as
7 Both coefficient embedding and canonical embedding are additive isomorphisms.
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explained in [14]. For S ⊆ V , the sum ∑x∈S ρr,c(x) (resp. ∑x∈S ρr(x)) is de-
noted as ρr,c(S) (resp. ρr(S)). The discrete Gaussian distribution over a lattice
L with center c and width r is defined by DL,r,c(x) = ρr,c(x)/ρr,c(L), for any
x ∈ L. In later discussion, we will use discrete Gaussians with respect to the
canonical embedding σ of the ring R. Viewing Zn as R by coefficient embedding,
we denote by ρ˜r,c(x) = exp
(−piT2(x− c)2/r2) the Gaussian function evaluated
by T2-norm, and by D˜Zn,r,c the corresponding discrete Gaussian distribution.
Similarly, the subscript c is omitted when c = 0. Sampling from D˜Zn,r,c is in fact
to sample from Dσ(Zn),r,σ(c) and then map to Zn via σ−1. Thus the results for
discrete Gaussians also hold for D˜Zn,r,c by replacing Euclidean norm and inner
product with T2-norm and corresponding inner product. For δ > 0, we denote
the smoothing parameter by ηδ(L) = min{r : ρ1/r(L̂) ≤ 1 + δ}. We now recall
some results which will be used later.
Lemma 1 ([35], Lemma 3.3). Let L be an n-dimensional full-rank lattice and
δ ∈ (0, 1). Then ηδ(L) ≤
√
ln(2n(1 + 1/δ))/pi · λn(L).
Lemma 2 ([37], Lemma 3.5). Let L be an n-dimensional full-rank lattice and
δ ∈ (0, 1). Then ηδ(L) ≤
√
ln(2n(1 + 1/δ))/pi/λ∞1
(
L̂
)
.
Lemma 3 ([35], Lemma 4.4). Let L ⊆ V be an n-dimensional full-rank lattice
and δ ∈ (0, 1). Then Prb←↩DL,r,c(‖b − c‖ ≥ r
√
n) ≤ 1+δ1−δ2−n for c ∈ V and
r ≥ ηδ(L).
Lemma 4 ([1], Lemma 2.9 8.). Let L ⊆ V be an n-dimensional full-rank
lattice. Then Prb←↩DL,r (|〈b,v〉| ≥ rt) ≤ 2 exp(−pit2) for r > 0, t > 0 and any
unit vector v ∈ V .
Lemma 5 ([23], Corollary 2.8). Let L′ ⊆ L ⊆ V be full-rank lattices and δ ∈
(0, 1/2). For c ∈ V and r ≥ ηδ(L′), we have ∆(DL,r,c mod L′;U(L/L′)) ≤ 2δ.
Lemma 6 ([23], Theorem 4.1). There exists a polynomial-time algorithm
that, given a basis (b1, · · · ,bn) of a lattice L, a parameter r = ω(
√
log n) max ‖bi‖
and a center c, outputs samples from a distribution statistically close to DL,r,c
with respect to n.
Hardness of RLWE The Ring Learning With Errors problem (RLWE) was first
proposed in [32] and shown hard for specific settings. In [14], Ducas and Durmus
gave an “easy-to-use” setting for RLWE and instantiated RLWE over general
cyclotomic rings. In this paper, we follow the setting of [14].
Definition 1 (RLWE error distribution in [14]). Let R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)).
Given ψ a distribution over Q[X]/(Θn(X)), we define ψ as the distribution over
R obtained by e = be′ mod Φn(X)e ∈ R with e′ ←↩ ψ. Here we denote by bfe
the polynomial whose coefficients are derived by rounding coefficients of f to the
nearest integers.
8 A clear proof was given in [28], Lemma 6
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Definition 2 (RLWE distribution in [14]). Let R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)) and Rq =
R/qR. For s ∈ Rq and ψ a distribution over Q[X]/(Θn(X)), we define As,ψ as
the distribution over Rq × Rq obtained by sampling the pair (a, as + e) where
a←↩ U(Rq) and e←↩ ψ.
Definition 3 (RLWEq,ψ,k). Let R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)) and Rq = R/qR. The pro-
blem RLWEq,ψ,k in the ring R is defined as follows. Given k samples drawn from
As,ψ where s←↩ U(Rq) and k samples from U(Rq ×Rq), distinguish them with
an advantage 1/ poly(n).
For certain error distributions, RLWE can be reduced from γ-Ideal-SVP. Note
that γ-Ideal-SVP discussed here is for the ring R and with respect to canonical
embedding.
Theorem 1 ([14], Theorem 2). Let n be an integer and n′ = 3+(−1)
n−1
4 n.
Choose q to be a prime congruent to 1 modulo n. Assume that α ∈ (0, 1)
is a real number such that αq > ω(
√
log n). Then for γ = O˜ (
√
n/α) and
t =
√
n′αq
(
ϕ(n)k
log(ϕ(n)k)
)1/4
, there exists a randomized quantum reduction from
γ-Ideal-SVP on ideal lattices in Z[X]/(Φn(X)) to RLWEq,ψn′t ,k that runs in time
O(q · poly(n)).
Let R×q be the set of all invertible elements of Rq. As explained in [40], one
can restrict As,ψ to R×q ×Rq and sample s from ψ, which leads to a variant of
RLWE (to distinguish As,ψ and U(R×q ×Rq)) with same hardness.
3 Discrete Gaussian Tail Inequalities
In our scheme, secret polynomials are drawn from discrete Gaussians with re-
spect to canonical embedding, while most arithmetic operations over the ring
are still with respect to coefficient embedding. In this section, we will give two
tail inequalities of Euclidean norm for a discrete Gaussian using T2-norm.
Let P (X) ∈ Z[X] be a monic irreducible polynomial of degree n and R =
Z[X]/(P (X)). Let V be the canonical embedding transformation of R and U =
VV∗ where V∗ is the conjugate transpose of V. Notice that T2(f)2 = ‖σ(f)‖2 =
fUf t, hence T2(f) ≥ s1(V)‖f‖ where s1(V) is the smallest singular value of
V. By Lemma 3, we get immediately the following tail inequality.
Lemma 7. Let P (X) ∈ Z[X] be a monic irreducible polynomial of degree n and
R = Z[X]/(P (X)). Let V be the canonical embedding transformation of R and
s1(V) be the smallest singular value of V. For δ ∈ (0, 1) and r ≥ ηδ(σ(Zn))
where σ is the canonical embedding, then
Pr
f←↩D˜Zn,r
(
‖f‖ ≥ r
√
n
s1(V)
)
≤ 1 + δ
1− δ 2
−n.
Lemma 7 coincides with Lemma 3 in [2], and the tail bound only depends on
the smallest singular value s1(V). Next we are to present a new tail inequality
involving all singular values of V.
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Lemma 8. Let P (X) ∈ Z[X] be a monic irreducible polynomial of degree n and
R = Z[X]/(P (X)). Let V be the canonical embedding transformation of R and
s1(V), · · · , sn(V) be all singular values of V. For r > 0, t > 0, then
Pr
f←↩D˜Zn,r
‖f‖ ≥ rt ·
√√√√ n∑
i=1
1
si(V)2
 ≤ 2n · exp(−pit2).
In particular, for t = ω
(√
lnn
)
, the above probability is n−ω(1).
Proof. Let U = VV∗, then it is known that U is a real symmetric matrix.
Thus there exist u1, · · · ,un ∈ Rn satisfying (1) each ui is an eigenvector of U
corresponding to the eigenvalue si(V)
2; (2) all these ui’s are unit vectors and
orthogonal to each other. Let pii(·) be the projection to ui, then f =
∑n
i=1 pii(f)
and all pii(f)’s are orthogonal to each other.
For a better illustration, we denote by 〈a, b〉M the inner product of a, b ∈ R
under canonical embedding, i.e. 〈a, b〉M = 〈σ(a), σ(b)〉 = aV(bV)∗ = aUbt.
Then we have
pii(f) = 〈f,ui〉ui = (futi)ui = 〈f,uiU−1〉Mui.
Let u′i = uiU
−1 = ui/si(V)2, then
T2(u
′
i) = ‖σ(u′i)‖ =
√
u′iUu
′t
i =
√
uiU−1uti =
1
si(V)
.
Note that we have applied T2 and σ to Rn. This is a natural extension, e.g., by
σ(u) = uV.
By the union bound, we have
Pr
f←↩D˜Zn,r
‖f‖ ≥ rt ·
√√√√ n∑
i=1
1
si(V)2
 = Pr
f←↩D˜Zn,r
(
n∑
i=1
‖pii(f)‖2 ≥
n∑
i=1
r2t2
si(V)2
)
≤
n∑
i=1
Pr
f←↩D˜Zn,r
(
‖pii(f)‖2 ≥ r
2t2
si(V)2
)
=
n∑
i=1
Pr
f←↩D˜Zn,r
(|〈f,u′i〉M | ≥ rt · T2(u′i))
By Lemma 4, the following inequality holds
Pr
f←↩D˜Zn,r
(|〈f,u′i〉M | ≥ rt · T2(u′i)) ≤ 2 exp(−pit2).
We now complete the proof. uunionsq
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Remark Let W1 =
√
n
s1(V)
and W2 =
√∑n
i=1
1
si(V)2
·ω
(√
lnn
)
corresponding to
the tail bound parameters in Lemmata 7 and 8 respectively. In general W2 can
be much smaller than W1 and the tail probability is still negligible in n, which
will be discussed later. Furthermore, following a similar proof of Lemma 8, we
can also prove new tail inequalities for the so-called ellipsoid Gaussian that is
a natural generalization of the discrete Gaussian we focused in this paper. We
include this part in Appendix A for interested readers.
4 New Results on General Cyclotomic Rings
In this section, we will develop a series of results on general cyclotomic rings and
give several special properties of prime power cyclotomic rings. While similar
results restricted to power-of-2 and prime cyclotomic rings have been discussed
in [40, 44], our results are a wider extension and some of them are with respect
to canonical embedding instead of coefficient embedding.
4.1 Duality Results for Module Lattices
Let K = Q[X]/(Φn(X)) ∼= Q(ξn) and R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)) ∼= Z[ξn] be the ring
of integers of K. Let q = 1 mod n be a prime and Rq = R/qR. We know that
Φn(X) splits completely into distinct linear factors modulo q. Let {φi}i=1,··· ,ϕ(n)
be the set of all roots of Φn(X) modulo q, then each ideal of Rq is of the form∏
i∈S(X − φi) · Rq with S ⊆ {1, · · · , ϕ(n)} and denoted by IS . We also denote
by JS the ideal {t ∈ R | t mod q ∈ IS} and by S¯ the set {1, · · · , ϕ(n)} \ S.
Given a ∈ Rmq , for each i, we choose an a˜i ∈ R such that pi(a˜i) = ai where
pi : R → Rq is the canonical homomorphism. Now we define R-modules a⊥(JS)
and L(a, JS) as follows:
a⊥(JS) :=
{
(t1, · · · , tm) ∈ Rm |
m∑
i=1
tia˜i = 0 mod q
}⋂
JmS ,
L(a, JS) := {(t1, · · · , tm) ∈ Rm | ∃s ∈ R,∀i, ti − a˜is ∈ JS} .
Here we denote by JmS the direct product JS×· · ·×JS . We first comment that the
above two modules are well defined as it is trivial to see that they are independent
of the choice of a˜i, since qR ⊆ JS . Secondly, we note that the R-modules a⊥(JS)
and L(a, JS) defined above are equivalent to that given in [40].
In this subsection, we view each element of R as its canonical embedding and
work with the inner product space H. Compared with coefficient embedding,
this leads to a different duality result. For t ∈ R, we denote by t the polynomial
t(X−1), where X−1 ∈ R is the inverse of X. It is easy to check that σ(t) = σ(t).
By abuse of notation, we also denote by 〈s, t〉 the inner product 〈σ(s), σ(t)〉 =
Tr(st). Let R∨ = {a ∈ K | Tr(aR) ⊆ Z} be the fractional ideal corresponding
to the dual lattice of R. The following lemma gives an explicit expression of the
dual lattice â⊥(JS).
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Lemma 9. Let R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)). Let q = 1 mod n be a prime and Rq =
R/qR. Given S ⊆ {1, · · · , ϕ(n)} and a ∈ Rmq , viewing each element of R as its
canonical embedding, we have:
â⊥(JS) =
1
q
{(t1, · · · , tm) ∈ (R∨)m | ∃s ∈ R∨,∀i, ti − a˜is ∈ JS¯R∨} .
Proof. Let L′(a, JS¯) = 1q {(t1, · · · , tm) ∈ (R∨)m | ∃s ∈ R∨,∀i, ti − a˜is ∈ JS¯R∨} .
We first prove that L′(a, JS¯) ⊆ â⊥(JS). Let t = (t1, · · · , tm) ∈ L′(a, JS¯) and
t′ = (t′1, · · · , t′m) ∈ a⊥(JS). We shall prove that
∑
i〈ti, t¯′i〉 =
∑
i Tr(tit
′
i) ∈ Z.
To this end, we notice that by the definition of L′(a, JS¯), there exists s ∈ R∨
such that qti = a˜is + bi and bi ∈ JS¯R∨. The fact that JSJS¯ = 〈q〉 implies
Tr(bit
′
i) = 0 mod q. Also by definition,
∑
i a˜it
′
i = 0 mod q. Therefore,∑
i
〈ti, t′i〉 =
1
q
∑
i
Tr((a˜is+ bi)t
′
i) =
1
q
Tr
(
s
∑
i
a˜it
′
i
)
+
1
q
∑
i
Tr (bit
′
i)
is an integer.
Next we prove ̂L′(a, JS¯) ⊆ a⊥(JS). Let t = (t1, · · · , tm) ∈ ̂L′(a, JS¯). Since
1
q (JS¯R∨, 0, · · · , 0) ⊆ L′(a, JS¯) and JS¯JS = 〈q〉, we obtain t1 ∈ JS . For the same
reason, we have ti ∈ JS for any i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. For any v ∈ R∨, from the fact
that 1q (a˜1, · · · , a˜m)v ∈ L′(a, JS¯), we have that Tr(v
∑
i a˜iti) = 0 mod q, which
means that
∑
i a˜iti = 0 mod q. Thus t = (t1, · · · , tm) ∈ a⊥(JS) and the proof is
completed. uunionsq
By scaling a certain factor, we obtain the following duality result between
two families of module lattices a⊥(JS) and L(a, JS).
Lemma 10. Let R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)) and n′ = deg(Θn(X)). Let q = 1 mod n
be a prime and Rq = R/qR. Let g =
∏
p(1 − Xn/p) ∈ R where p runs over
all odd primes dividing n. Given S ⊆ {1, · · · , ϕ(n)} and a ∈ Rmq , viewing each
element of R as its canonical embedding, we have:
â⊥(JS) =
g
qn′
· L(a, JS¯).
Proof. According to Corollary 2.18 in [33], we have R∨ = 〈g/n′〉. By Lemma 9,
we get the result immediately. uunionsq
Next, we shall show a quantitative relationship between the first minima of
â⊥(JS) and L(a, JS¯).
Lemma 11. Let R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)) and n′ = deg(Θn(X)). Let q = 1 mod n
be a prime and Rq = R/qR. Given S ⊆ {1, · · · , ϕ(n)} and a ∈ Rmq , viewing
each element of R as its canonical embedding, we have:
λ∞1
(
â⊥(JS)
)
≥ λ
∞
1 (L(a, JS¯))
qn′
.
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Proof. Let v = (v1, · · · , vm) ∈ â⊥(JS) such that T∞(v) = λ∞1
(
â⊥(JS)
)
. By
Lemma 10, we have that (u1, · · · , um) ∈ L(a, JS¯) where ui = qn
′
g · vi for all
i ∈ {1, · · · ,m} and g is defined in Lemma 10. Since g ∈ R, from the definition
of L(a, JS¯), it follows that u′ = (gu1, · · · , gum) = qn′ · (v1, · · · , vm) ∈ L(a, JS¯).
Thus we conclude that λ∞1
(
â⊥(JS)
)
= T∞(v) =
T∞(u′)
qn′ ≥ λ
∞
1 (L(a,JS¯))
qn′ . uunionsq
4.2 On the Absence of Unusually Short Vector in L(a, JS)
Let R×q be the set of all invertible elements of Rq, i.e. R×q = Rq \
⋃ϕ(n)
i=1 I{i}. For
a←↩ U((R×q )m), the lattice L(a, JS) is nearly impossible to contain an unusually
short vector for the `∞ norm with respect to canonical embedding.
Lemma 12. Let n > 2 and R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)). Let q = 1 mod n be a prime
and Rq = R/qR. For any S ⊆ {1, · · · , ϕ(n)}, m ≥ 2 and  > 0, viewing each
element of R as its canonical embedding, we have λ∞1 (L(a, JS)) ≥ q(1−
1
m )
|S|
ϕ(n)
−
with probability ≥ 1 − 2(2m+1)ϕ(n)
qmϕ(n)
over the uniformly random choice of a in
(R×q )m.
Proof. Let β = (1 − 1m ) |S|ϕ(n) −  and B = qβ . Let p be the probability over the
randomness of a that λ∞1 (L(a, JS)) < B.
Recall that by the definition, t ∈ L(a, JS) is verified by finding an s ∈ R such
that t−sa˜ ∈ JmS , where a˜ = (a˜1, · · · , a˜m). It is easy to see that for any s′ ∈ s+JS ,
t − s′a˜ ∈ JmS still holds true. Therefore, we only need to consider a set of
representatives of all cosets of JS , say {s1. · · · , sr} with r =
∣∣R/JS∣∣ = ∣∣Rq/IS∣∣.
Now for a non-zero vector t ∈ Rm with T∞(t) < B and an sj , we denote
p(t, sj) = Pra(∀i, ti − a˜isj ∈ JS) and pi(ti, sj) = Prai(ti − a˜isj ∈ JS). Then we
have p(t, sj) =
∏
i pi(ti, sj).
For f ∈ R, let S(f) = {i ∈ S | f(φi) = 0 mod q}. It suffices to consider such
(t, sj) pairs that S(sj) = S(ti) for all i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}; otherwise, we would have
p(t, sj) = 0 due to the invertibility of ai. For each such pair, we set d = |S(sj)|.
Notice that there are (q−1)d+ϕ(n)−|S| distinct ai’s inR×q such that ti−a˜isj ∈ JS ,
i.e. pi(ti, sj) = (q − 1)d−|S|, then we have p(t, sj) =
∏m
i=1 pi(ti, sj) = (q −
1)m(d−|S|). Therefore, the probability p is bounded by
p ≤
∑
0≤d≤|S|
∑
S′⊆S
|S′|=d
r∑
j=1
S(sj)=S
′
∑
t∈Rm
∀i,0<T∞(ti)<B
S(ti)=S
′
(q − 1)m(d−|S|).
For |S′| = d, let N(B, d) be the number of t ∈ R such that T∞(t) ∈ (0, B)
and S(t) = S′. We first show a lower bound of λ∞1 (JS′). For any t such that
S′ ⊆ S(t), the ideal 〈t〉 is a full-rank sub-ideal of the ideal JS′ . Thus, we have
N(t) = N(〈t〉) ≥ N(JS′) = qd. By equivalence of norms and arithmetic-geometric
inequality, we conclude that T∞(t) ≥ T2(t)√
ϕ(n)
≥ N(t)1/ϕ(n) ≥ qd/ϕ(n), which
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implies that λ∞1 (JS′) ≥ qd/ϕ(n). As a direct result, we get N(B, d) = 0 when
d ≥ βϕ(n).
We now suppose that d < βϕ(n). For any c ∈ H and l > 0, let C(l, c) = {v ∈
H | ‖v − c‖∞ < l}. We notice that N(B, d) is at most the number of points of
the lattice JS′ in the region C(B,0). For any two different points v1,v2 ∈ JS′ ,
it can be verified that C(λ,v1)
⋂
C(λ,v2) = ∅ where λ = λ∞1 (JS′)/2. For any
v ∈ C(B,0), we also have that C(λ,v) ⊆ C(B + λ,0). Combining the fact that
λ∞1 (JS′) ≥ qd/ϕ(n), it follows that N(B, d) ≤ vol(C(B+λ,0))vol(C(λ,0)) = (Bλ + 1)ϕ(n) ≤
3ϕ(n)qβϕ(n)−d.
Notice that the number of subsets of S is 2|S| and the number of sj ’s satisfying
S(sj) = S
′ is (q − 1)|S|−|S′|, a straightforward computation yields
p ≤ 2|S| max
d<βϕ(n)
N(B, d)m
(q − 1)(m−1)(|S|−d) ≤ 2
(2m+1)ϕ(n)q−ϕ(n)m.
We now complete the proof. uunionsq
Remark The above proof makes use of ideas from [41], but we consider the
case with respect to canonical embedding instead of coefficient embedding. It is
remarked that for coefficient embedding, we can also obtain a similar conclu-
sion for general cyclotomic rings by using the quantitative relationship between
Euclidean norm and T2-norm.
4.3 Improved Results on Regularity
Let χ be a distribution over Rq. We denote by Dχ the distribution of such tuple
(a1, · · · , am,
∑m
i=1 tiai) ∈ (R×q )m×Rq where ai ←↩ U(R×q ) and ti ←↩ χ for all i ∈
{1, · · · ,m}. The regularity of the generalized knapsack function (t1, · · · , tm) 7→∑m
i=1 tiai is the statistical distance between Dχ and U((R×q )m ×Rq).
In [34], Micciancio discussed the regularity over general rings and used it to
design one-way functions. Improved regularity results for power-of-2 and prime
cyclotomic rings were proposed in [40, 44] respectively. However, the results
in [40, 44] only focus on two special classes of cyclotomic rings and are under
coefficient embedding. The regularity result with respect to canonical embedding
was shown in [33] and applied to general cyclotomic rings, but it has some limi-
tations for certain cryptographic applications.9 Here, we will give an improved
result that applies to general cyclotomic rings and has more flexibility than that
in [33]. In particular, we will focus on the case where m = 2 for pNE applications.
Since ai ∈ R×q , there are q(m−1)(ϕ(n)−|S|) elements of a⊥(JS) in [0, q−1]mϕ(n).
Thus we have that |Zmϕ(n)/a⊥(JS)| = qϕ(n)+(m−1)|S|. The following lemma can
be proved by combining Lemmata 2, 5, 11 and 12.
Lemma 13. Let n > 2,R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)) and n′ = deg(Θn(X)). Let q =
1 mod n be a prime and Rq = R/qR. Let S ⊆ {1, · · · , ϕ(n)}, m ≥ 2,  >
9 As discussed in [44], it does not suffice to construct pNE only from the regularity
result in [33].
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0, δ ∈ (0, 12 ). Let r ≥ n′
√
ln(2mϕ(n)(1 + 1/δ))/pi · q 1m+(1− 1m ) |S|ϕ(n) +, c ∈ Rmϕ(n)
and t ←↩ D˜Zmϕ(n),r,c. Then for all except a fraction ≤ 2(2m+1)ϕ(n)q−mϕ(n) of
a ∈ (R×q )m, we have
∆
(
t mod a⊥(JS);U(Zmϕ(n)/a⊥(JS))
)
≤ 2δ
and ∣∣∣D˜Zmϕ(n),r,c(a⊥(JS))− q−ϕ(n)−(m−1)|S|∣∣∣ ≤ 2δ.
Remark Let t ∈ Rm be a Gaussian sample in Lemma 13. Choose δ = q−cn
with c = O(1) and r = O˜(n1.5)q
1
m+
′
. From Lemma 15, we will see that ‖t‖ =
O˜(n1.5)
√
mq
1
m+
′
when n is a prime power. The size of Gaussian sample is
asymptotically the same as that in [40] when n = 2k, and smaller than that
in [44] when n is a prime. We also remark that the regularity result in [33]
allows a smaller sample width (r ≥ 2ϕ(n) · q 1m+′), but it seems to work only for
the case of δ = 2−Θ(n).
From the generalized knapsack function (t1, · · · , tm) 7→
∑m
i=1 tiai, we obtain
an isomorphism Zmϕ(n)/a⊥(J∅) ∼= Rq. Thus Lemma 13 gives immediately the
following regularity result.
Theorem 2. Let n > 2,R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)) and n′ = deg(Θn(X)). Let q =
1 mod n be a prime and Rq = R/qR. Let m ≥ 2,  > 0, δ ∈ (0, 12 ) and
ai ←↩ U(R×q ) for any i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. Then, for t ←↩ D˜Zmϕ(n),r with r ≥
n′
√
ln(2mϕ(n)(1 + 1/δ))/pi · q 1m+, we have
∆
((
a1, · · · , am,
m∑
i=1
tiai
)
;U
(
(R×q )m ×Rq
)) ≤ 2δ + 2(2m+1)ϕ(n)q−mϕ(n).
4.4 Properties of Prime Power Cyclotomic Rings
Prime power cyclotomic rings are a kind of fundamental cyclotomic rings with a
relatively simple form. All cyclotomic rings can be decomposed into the tensor
product of prime power cyclotomic rings [33]10. In this paper, we will construct
a class of provably secure NTRU schemes over prime power cyclotomic rings. To
this end, we list some useful properties of this kind of rings.
Firstly we prove several basic facts about singular values of the canonical
embedding transformation of a prime power cyclotomic ring. These facts profile
the geometry of prime power cyclotomic rings under coefficient embedding and
canonical embedding.
Lemma 14. Let n = dν with d a prime and R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)). Let V be
the canonical embedding transformation of R and s1(V), · · · , sϕ(n)(V) be all
singular values of V in increasing order. Then s1(V) = · · · = snd (V) =
√
n
d and
others equal
√
n.
10 This property is useful under canonical embedding, but we may not need to use it
in this paper.
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Proof. It suffices to calculate the eigenvalues of U = VV∗. Let ω1, · · · , ωϕ(n) be
all roots of Φn(X), then V = (ω
i−1
j )1≤i,j≤ϕ(n). Let U = (uij)1≤i,j≤ϕ(n). By a
routine computation, it follows that
uij =

ϕ(n), for i = j;
−nd , for i 6= j and i = j mod nd ;
0, for i 6= j mod nd .
Let ei be the i-th row of the ϕ(n)-dimensional identity matrix. Let xi =∑
j=i mod nd
ej where i ∈ {1, · · · , nd } and the subindex j is within {1, · · · , ϕ(n)}.
It can be verified that all nd xi’s are eigenvectors of U with respect to eigenvalue
n
d . Let yij = ei − ei+ jnd where i ∈ {1, · · · ,
n
d } and j ∈ {1, · · · , d − 2}. These
n(d−2)
d = ϕ(n)− nd yij ’s are also eigenvectors of U and corresponding eigenvalues
equal n. Notice that all xi’s and yij ’s are ϕ(n) linearly independent vectors,
hence we complete the proof. uunionsq
Combining Lemmata 8 and 14, we obtain a tail inequality immediately. It
should be remarked that Lemmata 7 and 14 can also yield a tail inequality: the
tail bound may be smaller by a logarithmic factor at most but is also likely to
be larger by a polynomial factor of n for certain cases, such as n = d. Thus we
only use the following result in later discussion.
Lemma 15. Let n = dν with d a prime and R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)). For r > 0,
then
Pr
f←↩D˜Zϕ(n),r
(
‖f‖ ≥ r
√
2(d− 1)
d
· ω (lnn)
)
≤ n−ω(1).
The multiplicative expansion factor ofR is defined as γ×(R) = maxf,g∈R ‖fg‖‖f‖‖g‖ .
For prime and power-of-2 cyclotomic rings, their expansion factors are of size
O(
√
n) where n is the order (see [22, 44]). The following lemma indicates that, for
general prime power cyclotomic rings, their expansion factors are well-bounded
as well.
Lemma 16. Let n = dν with d a prime and R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)). For any
f, g ∈ R, we have ‖fg‖∞ ≤ 2‖f‖‖g‖ and ‖fg‖ ≤ 2
√
ϕ(n)‖f‖‖g‖.
Proof. We first consider the multiplication over the ring R′ = Z[X]/(Xn − 1).
Let f ′, g′ ∈ R′ be the polynomials with the same coefficients as f, g respectively,
i.e. all leading coefficients are 0. Let h′ ∈ R′ be the product of f ′ and g′.
We denote by (f ′0, · · · , f ′n−1), (g′0, · · · , g′n−1) and (h′0, · · · , h′n−1) the coefficient
vectors of f ′, g′ and h′. It is known that h′i =
∑n−1
j=0 f
′
jg
′
(i−j) mod n. By Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, we have |h′i| ≤ ‖f ′‖‖g′‖ = ‖f‖‖g‖ for any i.
Let h = fg ∈ R. We deduce that h = h′ mod Φn(X) from the fact that Φn(X)
is a factor of Xn − 1. Notice that X l = −(X nd ·(d−2) + · · ·+X nd + 1)X l−ϕ(n) for
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any l ∈ [ϕ(n), n), hence we have
h =
ϕ(n)−1∑
i=0
(
h′i − h′ϕ(n)+(i mod nd )
)
Xi.
It leads to that
‖h‖∞ = max
0≤i<ϕ(n)
{|h′i − hϕ(n)+(i mod nd )|} ≤ 2 max0≤i<n{|h
′
i|} ≤ 2‖f‖‖g‖.
Then we conclude that ‖h‖ ≤√ϕ(n)‖h‖∞ ≤ 2√ϕ(n)‖f‖‖g‖. uunionsq
5 pNE over Prime Power Cyclotomic Rings
In this section, we will describe a class of NTRUEncrypt over general prime po-
wer cyclotomic rings whose IND-CPA security can be reduced from RLWE and
approximate Ideal-SVP. Our scheme is adapted from that in [40, 44] with modi-
fied key generation algorithm. We denote by pNE(n, d, ν, q, p, r, α, k) the provably
secure NTRU specified by the following public parameters.
– Let R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)) and its order n = dν where d is a prime.
– Let q = 1 mod n be a prime and Rq = R/qR. The ciphertext space is Rq.
– Let p ∈ R×q be of small norm, such as p = 2 or p = x+3. The message space
is R/pR.
– The parameter r is the width of discrete Gaussian distribution used for key
generation.
– The parameters α and k determine the RLWE error distribution.
Three main algorithms are listed as follows.
– Key Generation. Sample f ′ from D˜Zϕ(n),r; if f = pf ′ + 1 mod q /∈ R×q ,
resample. Sample g from D˜Zϕ(n),r; if g mod q /∈ R×q , resample. Then return
private key sk = f ∈ R×q and public key pk = h = pg/f ∈ R×q .
– Encryption. Given message M ∈ R/pR, let t = √n′αq
(
ϕ(n)k
log(ϕ(n)k)
)1/4
where n′ = deg(Θn(X)), set s, e←↩ ψn′t and return ciphertext C = hs+pe+
M ∈ Rq.
– Decryption. Given ciphertext C and private key f , compute C ′ = (fC mod
q) and return C ′ mod p.
In the rest of this section, we will give an analysis of the above algorithms and
propose a set of parameters that make pNE workable and provably secure.
5.1 Key Generation
Gaussian sampler is a core component of the key generation algorithm. Since our
parameter conditions are much stronger than that in Lemma 6, we now assume
that a polynomial-time perfect discrete Gaussian sampler is available. First, we
show that the key generation algorithm terminates in expected polynomial time
for selective parameters.
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Lemma 17. Let n = dν with d a prime and R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)). Let q =
1 mod n be a prime and Rq = R/qR. For any δ ∈ (0, 1/2), choose
r ≥ ϕ(n)√ln(2ϕ(n)(1 + 1/δ))/pi · q1/ϕ(n), then we have
Pr
f ′←↩D˜Zϕ(n),r
(
(p · f ′ + a mod q) /∈ R×q
) ≤ ϕ(n)(1/q + 2δ)
holds for a ∈ R and p ∈ R×q
Proof. Notice that the norm of J{k} is N(J{k}) = q and the discriminant of the
cyclotomic field K = Q[X]/(Φn(X)) is ∆K ≤ ϕ(n)ϕ(n) (see [33] for the latter).
The volume of the ideal lattice σ(J{k}) is given by vol(σ(J{k})) = N(J{k})
√
∆K .
Thus we have that λ1(σ(J{k})) ≤
√
ϕ(n) vol(σ(J{k}))1/ϕ(n) ≤ ϕ(n)q1/ϕ(n) by
Minkowski’s first theorem. Since λϕ(n)(σ(J{k})) = λ1(σ(J{k})), by Lemma 1, we
have r ≥ ηδ(σ(J{k})). Together with Lemma 5, it leads to that the probability
of p · f ′+ a = 0 mod J{k} is at most 1/q+ 2δ. The final result is proved by using
the union bound. uunionsq
Next we give a result showing that the sizes of secret polynomials f and
g are small with overwhelming probability. Despite that f and g are sampled
from Gaussian using T2-norm, to compare with NTRU, we measure their sizes
by Euclidean norms of their coefficient vectors.
Lemma 18. Let n = dν with d a prime and q > 8n be a prime satisfying q =
1 mod n. Let r ≥ ϕ(n)
√
2 ln(6ϕ(n))
pi · q1/ϕ(n). Then with probability ≥ 1− n−ω(1),
the secret key polynomials f , g satisfy
‖f‖ ≤ ω
(√
n lnn
)
· ‖p‖r and ‖g‖ ≤ ω
(√
lnn
)
· r.
If deg p = 0, then ‖f‖ ≤ ω
(√
lnn
)
· ‖p‖r with probability ≥ 1− n−ω(1).
Proof. Applying Lemma 15, we have
Pr
g←↩D˜Zϕ(n),r
(
‖g‖ ≥ ω
(√
lnn
)
· r
)
≤ n−ω(1).
Let δ = 110ϕ(n)−1 . Since r ≥ ϕ(n)
√
ln(2ϕ(n)(1 + 1/δ))/pi · q1/ϕ(n), Lemma 17
yields
Pr
g←↩D˜Zϕ(n),r
(
‖g‖ ≥ ω
(√
lnn
)
· r | g ∈ R×q
)
≤
Prg←↩D˜Zϕ(n),r
(
‖g‖ ≥ ω
(√
lnn
)
· r
)
Prg←↩D˜Zϕ(n),r
(
g ∈ R×q
)
≤n−ω(1) · 1
1− ϕ(n)(1/q + 2δ) = n
−ω(1).
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Thus we get that ‖g‖ ≤ ω
(√
lnn
)
· r with probability ≥ 1− n−ω(1). The same
argument holds true for the polynomial f ′ such that f = p · f ′ + 1.
If deg p = 0, we have ‖f‖ ≤ 1 + ‖p‖‖f ′‖ ≤ ω
(√
lnn
)
· ‖p‖r with probability
≥ 1 − n−ω(1). For general cases, applying Lemma 16, we know that ‖f‖ ≤
1 + 2
√
ϕ(n)‖p‖‖f ′‖ ≤ ω
(√
n lnn
)
· ‖p‖r with probability ≥ 1− n−ω(1). uunionsq
For power-of-2 and prime cyclotomic rings, sampling f and g with certain
width r makes the public key almost uniform over R×q , which is a remarkable
property for provably secure NTRU. Similar conclusion holds for general cycloto-
mic rings as well, by considering the Gaussian sampling with respect to canonical
embedding.
Theorem 3. Let n > 7 and R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)). Let q = 1 mod n be a prime
and Rq = R/qR. Let D×r,z be the discrete Gaussian D˜Zϕ(n),r restricted to z +
R×q + qZϕ(n). Let  ∈ (0, 1/3) and choose r ≥ n1.5
√
ln(8nq) · q 12 +, then we have
∆
(
y1 + p ·D×r,z1
y2 + p ·D×r,z2
mod q;U(R×q )
)
≤ 65
ϕ(n)
qbϕ(n)c
for p ∈ R×q , yi ∈ Rq and zi = −yip−1 mod q for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Remark The proof essentially follows the same approach in [40], but some
differences still need to be treated. Thus we include the proof in Appendix B for
reference.
5.2 Decryption
A successful decryption is ensured by the fact that a polynomial with all coef-
ficients within [− q2 , q2 ) keeps unchanged after the reduction modulo q. In the
decryption algorithm, we calculate a middle term C ′ = fC = pgs + pfe +
fM mod q. We now estimate the `∞ norms of pgs, pfe and fM respectively.
Both s and e follow the “easy-to-use” RLWE error distribution [14] that is
based on spherical Gaussian rather than classical discrete Gaussian. In [44], the
authors gave a tail inequality for such error term and used it to estimate the
norms of pgs and pfe. We now propose an improved bound for the norms of pgs
and pfe. The main idea is to treat pgs as one term rather than consider pg and
s separately, which makes a better use of the properties of Gaussian.
Lemma 19. Let n = dν > 7 with d a prime and R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)). Let
n′ = deg(Θn(X)). We view each element of R as its coefficient vector. For any
fixed y ∈ R and t ≥ √n, we have
Pr
z←↩ψn′t
(
‖yz‖∞ ≥ ω
(√
lnn
)
‖y‖t
)
≤ n−ω(1).
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Proof. Let z = z(1) + z(2) where z(1) = z′ mod Φn(X) with z′ ←↩ ψn′t and
z(2) =
∑ϕ(n)−1
i=0 iX
i with i ∈ [− 12 , 12 ) for any i. Next we only prove the case of
d being an odd prime and the same argument holds true for d = 2.
Let (z′0, · · · , z′n−1) be the coefficient vector of z′ where all zi’s follow ψt.
Let R′ = Q[X]/(Θn(X)). Let y′ ∈ R′ be the polynomial with the same coeffi-
cients as y, i.e. all leading coefficients are 0, and w′ = y′z′ ∈ R′. We denote by
(y′0, · · · , y′n−1) and (w′0, · · · , w′n−1) the coefficient vectors of y′ and w′ respecti-
vely. It is known that w′i =
∑n−1
j=0 z
′
jy
′
(i−j) mod n. Notice that yz
(1) = w′ mod
Φn(X), we have that the i-th coefficient of yz
(1) is ci = w
′
i − w′ϕ(n)+(i mod nd ) =∑n−1
j=0 z
′
jyi,j where yi,j = y
′
(i−j) mod n − y′(ϕ(n)+(i mod nd )−j) mod n. Since all z
′
j ’s
are independently drawn from ψt, the term
∑n−1
j=0 z
′
jyi,j follows the distribution
ψY t where Y =
√∑n−1
j=0 y
2
i,j ≤ 2‖y‖. By Gaussian tail inequality (derived from
the Chernoff bound), for any i, we have
Pr
(
|ci| ≥ ω
(√
lnn
)
‖y‖t
)
≤ n−ω(1).
By the union bound, it follows that
Pr
(
‖yz(1)‖∞ ≥ ω
(√
lnn
)
‖y‖t
)
≤ n−ω(1).
For ‖yz(2)‖∞, from Lemma 16, we have ‖yz(2)‖∞ ≤
√
ϕ(n)‖y‖. Due to the
fact t ≥ √n and ‖yz‖∞ ≤ ‖yz(1)‖∞+ ‖yz(2)‖∞, we now complete the proof. uunionsq
Together with Lemmata 18 and 16, we obtain a bound of the norms of pgs
and pfe.
Lemma 20. In pNE(n, d, ν, q, p, r, α, k), t =
√
n′αq
(
ϕ(n)k
log(ϕ(n)k)
)1/4
>
√
n where
n′ = deg(Θn(X)). Then we have
max {‖pgs‖∞, ‖pfe‖∞} ≤ ω (n log n) ‖p‖2rt
with probability at least 1− n−ω(1). In particular, if deg p = 0, then
max {‖pgs‖∞, ‖pfe‖∞} ≤ ω (log n) ‖p‖2rt
with probability at least 1− n−ω(1).
For the term fM , its norm can be bounded as well.
Lemma 21. In pNE(n, d, ν, q, p, r, α, k), we have ‖fM‖∞ ≤ ω
(√
n3 log n
)
·
‖p‖2r with probability at least 1 − n−ω(1). In particular, if deg p = 0, then
‖fM‖∞ ≤ ω
(√
n log n
) · ‖p‖2r with probability at least 1− n−ω(1).
Proof. By reducing modulo the pXi’s, we can write M into
∑ϕ(n)−1
i=0 ipX
i with
i ∈ (− 12 , 12 ] and then get ‖M‖ ≤ 2
√
ϕ(n)‖∑ϕ(n)−1i=0 iXi‖‖p‖ ≤ ϕ(n)‖p‖ from
Lemma 16. If deg p = 0, we have ‖M‖ = ‖p‖ · ‖∑ϕ(n)−1i=0 iXi‖ ≤ √ϕ(n)2 ‖p‖.
Then, combining Lemmata 18 and 16 with the above result, the proof is com-
pleted. uunionsq
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Combining Lemmata 20 and 21, we give a set of parameters such that
pNE enjoys a high probability of successful decryption.
Theorem 4. Let t =
√
n′αq
(
ϕ(n)k
log(ϕ(n)k)
)1/4
>
√
n where n′ = deg(Θn(X)). If
ω (n log n) ‖p‖2rt/q < 1 (resp. ω (log n) ‖p‖2rt/q < 1 if deg p = 0), then the
decryption algorithm of pNE recovers M with probability 1 − n−ω(1) over the
choice of s, e, f, g.
5.3 Security Reduction and Parameters
The provable security of pNE is guaranteed by the following theorem. The proof
totally follows from that in [44] and thus we omit it.
Lemma 22. Let n = dν > 7 with d a prime and R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)). Let
q > 8n be a prime congruent to 1 modulo n and Rq = R/qR. Let p ∈ R×q
and t =
√
n′αq
(
ϕ(n)k
log(ϕ(n)k)
)1/4
>
√
n where n′ = deg(Θn(X)). Let  ∈ (0, 1/3)
and r ≥ n1.5√ln(8nq) ·q 12 +. If there exists an IND-CPA attack against pNE that
runs in time T and has success probability 1/2+δ, then there exists an algorithm
solving RLWEq,ψ,k with ψ = ψ
n′
t that runs in time T
′ = T+O(kn) and has success
probability 1/2 + δ′ where δ′ = δ/2− q−Ω(n).
Combining Lemma 22 with Theorems 4 and 1, we get our main result.
Theorem 5. Let n = dν > 7 with d a prime and R = Z[X]/(Φn(X)). Suppose
q = 1 mod n is a prime of size poly(n) and q
1
2− = ω
(
n3.25 log2 n‖p‖2)(resp.
q
1
2− = ω
(
n2.25 log2 n‖p‖2), if deg p = 0) for any  ∈ (0, 1/3) and p ∈ R×q . Let
r = n1.5
√
ln(8nq) · q 12 + and t = √n′αq
(
ϕ(n)k
log(ϕ(n)k)
)1/4
where n′ = deg(Θn(X)),
k = O(1) and αq = Ω(log0.75 n). If there exists an IND-CPA attack against
pNE(n, d, ν, q, p, r, α, k) that runs in time poly(n) and has success probability
1/2 + 1/poly(n), then there exists a poly(n)-time algorithm solving γ-Ideal-SVP
on ideal lattices in Z[X]/(Φn(X)) with γ = O˜
(√
nq/ log0.75 n
)
. Moreover, the
decryption success probability exceeds 1−n−ω(1) over the choice of the encryption
randomness.
By choosing  = o(1) and p to be a constant number, the minimal modulus q
for which pNE holds is Ω˜(n4.5), and the minimal approximate factor γ is O˜(n5).
For the case d = 2, our results are asymptotically the same as the improved
version shown in [41] (note that the original version was described in [40]). Our
result improves that in [44] by a factor of Θ˜(n3) for the case where n is a
prime, as the smallest q and γ shown in [44] are Ω˜(n7.5) and O˜(n8) respectively.
Moreover, our result shows that pNE over general prime power cyclotomic rings
can achieve asymptotically same efficiency as that over power-of-2 cyclotomic
rings that are used widely but scarce. Thus, the NTRU scheme in this paper has
better compactness and wider applicability.
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6 Some Remarks on Further Extension
A recent paper [38] demonstrates a polynomial-time quantum reduction from
worst-case ideal lattice problems to RLWE for general rings, which provides a
theoretical grounding for the further extension of pNE.
Given a monic irreducible polynomial P (X) ∈ Z[X] of degree n, let K =
Q[X]/(P (X)) and R = Z[X]/(P (X)) be an order in K. Let q be a prime such
that P (X) splits into n distinct linear factors modulo q11. Let R∨ = {a ∈ K |
Tr(aR) ⊆ Z}. We also follow the definitions of R-modules and ideals shown in
Sect. 4.
Under above setting, we observe that Lemmata 9 and 12 still can be proved
following almost the same approach. It is worth noting that the ideals that we
discuss are in R rather than the ring of integers of K, which is a little different
from the setting in [38]12. It also holds that N(t) = |R/tR| for any t ∈ R
(see [11]), which ensures that all proofs go through. However, Lemmata 10 and 11
require some modifications to apply to general case. Note that the scaling factor
(before L(a, JS¯)) in Lemma 10 is exclusive for cyclotomic rings. For general
case, the duality result can be that â⊥(JS) = 1qP ′ · L(a, JS¯) where P ′ ∈ R is
the derivative of P (X), thanks to the fact R∨ = 1P ′R (see [10]). We define a
function as
α(P ) = min
s∈R,s6=0
T∞(sP ′).
Using a similar proof of Lemma 11, we can obtain a quantitative relationship
(perhaps not optimal)
λ∞1
(
â⊥(JS)
)
≥ λ
∞
1 (L(a, JS¯))
qα(P )
.
As a direct consequence, we get the following regularity result for general rings,
which shows that α(P ) is relevant to the lower bound of Gaussian width making
the public key uniform.
Proposition 1. Let P (X) ∈ Z[X] be a monic irreducible polynomial of degree
n > 2 and R = Z[X]/(P (X)). Let α(P ) = mins∈R,s 6=0 T∞(sP ′) where P ′ is the
derivative of P (X). Suppose q is a prime such that P (X) splits into n distinct
linear factors modulo q. Let S ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, m ≥ 2,  > 0, δ ∈ (0, 12 ), and choose
r ≥ α(P )√ln(2mn(1 + 1/δ))/pi · q 1m+(1− 1m ) |S|n +, c ∈ Rmn and t ←↩ D˜Zmn,r,c.
Then for all except a fraction ≤ 2(2m+1)nq−mn of a ∈ (R×q )m, we have
∆
(
t mod a⊥(JS);U(Zmn/a⊥(JS))
) ≤ 2δ
and ∣∣∣D˜Zmn,r,c(a⊥(JS))− q−n−(m−1)|S|∣∣∣ ≤ 2δ.
11 As discussed in [41], a more general case that P (X) splits into distinct factors of
same degree may be treated using similar arguments.
12 If K is a cyclotomic field, its ring of integers is R.
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For a fixed Gaussian width r, Lemma 8 implies an attribute relevant to the
Euclidean lengths of the secret polynomials:
β(P ) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
1
si(V)2
where V is the canonical embedding transformation and si(V)’s are its singular
values. More precisely, it holds that ‖f ′‖, ‖g‖ ≤ rβ(P )ω(√log n) with overw-
helming probability where f = pf ′ + 1 and g are the secret keys. Moreover,
the expansion factor of R, denoted by γ(P ) = γ×(R), also affects the sizes of
parameters for successful decryption.
In practice, it may be hard to calculate α(P ), β(P ) and γ(P ), but we can
replace them by their upper bounds during estimating parameters. Next we are
to discuss some concrete polynomials.
Cyclotomic Polynomial For general cyclotomic polynomials, their α(P ) are well-
bounded by the cyclotomic indices.
Proposition 2. For any n > 0, α(Φn) ≤ n′ where n′ = deg(Θn(X)).
Proof. Let s = Θn(X)/Φn(X) and P (X) = Φn(X), then α(P ) ≤ T∞(sP ′(X)).
Notice that n′Xn
′−1 = Θ′n(X) = sP
′(X) + s′P (X), we have α(P ) ≤ n′. uunionsq
For β(P ) and γ(P ), we have discussed the case of prime power cyclotomic rings
before. When it comes to general cyclotomic rings, estimating β(P ) and γ(P )
will be much more complicated. It is noted that β(P ) is always Ω(1), and γ(P )
could be super-polynomial when n is highly composite.
NTRU Prime Polynomial The so-called NTRU Prime polynomial is P (X) =
Xn −X − 1 where n is a prime. This kind of polynomials were suggested in [5]
and discussed in [3, 28]. The following proposition shows that NTRU Prime po-
lynomials have small α(P ) and γ(P ).
Proposition 3. For P (X) = Xn−X−1, we have α(P ) ≤ 2n and γ(P ) ≤ 2√n.
Proof. Let ω1 · · ·ωn be all roots of P (X). It can be verified that |ωi| ≤ nn−1 for
any i. Then it follows that α(P ) ≤ T∞(XP ′(X)) = T∞(n+ (n− 1)X) ≤ 2n.
Let f, g ∈ R and h = fg ∈ R. We denote by (f0, · · · , fn−1), (g0, · · · , gn−1)
and (h0, · · · , hn−1) the coefficient vectors of f, g and h. By a routine compu-
tation, we know that hk =
∑k
i=0 figk−i +
∑n−1
i=k+1 figk+n−i +
∑n−1
i=k figk−1+n−i
and then |hk| ≤ 2‖f‖‖g‖. It follows that ‖h‖ ≤ 2
√
n‖f‖‖g‖. uunionsq
For β(P ), we calculate the values experimentally and plot them in Figure 1. For
comparison, we also calculate the tail bound indicated in Lemma 7. We observe
that β(P ) is quite small for NTRU Prime polynomials and the tail bound in
Lemma 8 seems much tighter than that of Lemma 7.
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Fig. 1. Experimental measure of β(P ).
Overall, to design a relatively compact pNE, it may be crucial to find a poly-
nomial P (X) with well-bounded α(P ), β(P ) and γ(P ). For a certain polynomial,
we still need to consider some other factors of pNE, such as RLWE error and the
minima of R (with respect to the T2-norm). We leave to future work the further
investigation of concrete polynomial selections.
A Tail Inequalities for Ellipsoid Gaussians
For an n-dimensional ellipsoid Gaussian, the width r is replaced by a rank-n ma-
trix R ∈ Rn×m and the Gaussian function is defined by ρR,c(x) = exp
(
−pi(x− c) (RRt)−1 (x− c)t
)
.
Let DL,R,c be the ellipsoid Gaussian over a lattice L with center c. We omit the
subscript c when c = 0. Let s1(R) ≤ · · · ≤ sn(R) be all singular values of R,
then we have the following result.
Lemma 23. Let L ⊆ Rn be an n-dimensional full-rank lattice. For t > 0 and a
rank-n matrix R ∈ Rn×m, then
Pr
b←↩DL,R
‖b‖ ≥ t
√√√√ n∑
i=1
si(R)2
 ≤ 2n · exp(−pit2).
Proof. Let U = (RRt)
−1
, then U is a rank-n real symmetric matrix. Thus there
exist u1, · · · ,un ∈ Rn satisfying (1) each ui is an eigenvector of U corresponding
to the eigenvalue 1si(R)2 ; (2) all these ui’s are unit vectors and orthogonal to each
other. Let pii(·) be the projection to ui, then b =
∑n
i=1 pii(b) and all pii(b)’s are
orthogonal to each other.
By Cholesky decomposition, we know that there exists a full-rank square
matrix V such that U = VVt. Let b′ = bV and u′i = uiV
−t, then 〈b,ui〉 =
〈b′,u′i〉 and
‖u′i‖2 = uiV−tV−1uti = uiU−1uti = si(R)2.
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Notice that ρR(x) = exp (−pixUxt) = exp
(−pi‖xV‖2), thus the ellipsoid Gaus-
sian DL,R multiplying V is equivalent to DL′,1 where L′ is the lattice {xV | x ∈
L}. It follows from Lemma 4 that
Pr
b←↩DL,R
(|〈b,ui〉| ≥ t · si(R)) = Pr
b′←↩DL′,1
(|〈b′,u′i〉| ≥ t · ‖u′i‖) ≤ 2 · exp(−pit2).
By the union bound, we have
Pr
b←↩DL,R
‖b‖ ≥ t
√√√√ n∑
i=1
si(R)2
 = Pr
b←↩DL,R
(
n∑
i=1
‖pii(b)‖2 ≥
n∑
i=1
t2si(R)
2
)
≤
n∑
i=1
Pr
b←↩DL,R
(‖pii(b)‖2 ≥ t2si(R)2)
=
n∑
i=1
Pr
b←↩DL,R
(|〈b,ui〉| ≥ t · si(R))
≤ 2n · exp(−pit2).
We now complete the proof. uunionsq
For a general center c, we may also prove a similar result.
Lemma 24. Let L ⊆ Rn be an n-dimensional full-rank lattice and δ ∈ (0, 1).
For t > 0, c ∈ Rn and a rank-n matrix R ∈ Rn×m such that s1(R) ≥ ηδ(L)
where s1(R) is the smallest singular value of R, then
Pr
b←↩DL,R,c
‖b− c‖ ≥ t
√√√√ n∑
i=1
si(R)2
 ≤ 2n1 + δ
1− δ · exp(−pit
2).
We first prove two following lemmata that will be useful in the proof of Lemma 24.
Lemma 25. Let L ⊆ V be an n-dimensional full-rank lattice and c ∈ V . For
r ≥ ηδ(L), t > 0 and any unit vector v ∈ V , then Prb←↩DL,r,c(|〈b − c,v〉| ≥
rt) ≤ 2 1+δ1−δ · exp(−pit2).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 6 in [28], we write the expectation of
exp
(
2pit〈b−c,v〉
r
)
as
E
[
exp
(
2pit〈b− c,v〉
r
)]
=
ρr,c+rtv(L)
ρr,c(L) · exp
(
pit2
)
.
By Lemma 2.7 in [23], we have the above expectation belongs to
[
1−δ
1+δ ,
1+δ
1−δ
]
·
exp
(
pit2
)
. Using Markov’s inequality, we immediately obtain the result. uunionsq
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Lemma 26. Let L be an n-dimensional full-rank lattice and V ∈ Rn×n be a
full-rank matrix. Let L′ be the lattice {xV | x ∈ L} and sn(V) be the largest
singular value of V. Then sn(V)ηδ(L) ≥ ηδ(L′) for δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. It can be verified that L̂′ = {xV−t | x ∈ L̂}. Notice that ‖x‖2 ≤
sn(V)
2‖xV−t‖2, thus ρ1/s
(
L̂
)
≥ ρ1/(sn(V)s)
(
L̂′
)
. From the definition of smoo-
thing parameter, we complete the proof. uunionsq
Proof ( Lemma 24). Combining the proof of Lemma 23 with Lemmata 25 and 26,
the result can be proved directly.
B Proof of Theorem 3
For a ∈ R×q , we define Pra = Prf1,f2 ((y1 + pf1)/(y2 + pf2) = a), where fi ←↩
D×r,zi . It suffices to prove that |Pra−(q − 1)−ϕ(n)| ≤ 2
2ϕ(n)+5
qbϕ(n)c · (q − 1)−ϕ(n) =: ′
for all except a fraction ≤ 64ϕ(n)q−ϕ(n) of a ∈ R×q .
For a = (a1, a2) ∈ (R×q )2, let Pra = Prf1,f2 [a1f1 + a2f2 = a1z1 + a2z2], then
we have Pra = Pr−a2·a−11 . We consider the equation a1f1 + a2f2 = a1z1 + a2z2
of the pair (f1, f2). All its solutions form the set z + a
⊥× where z = (z1, z2) and
a⊥× = a⊥
⋂
(R×q + qZϕ(n))2. Then it leads to that
Pra =
D˜Z2ϕ(n),r(z + a
⊥×)
D˜Zϕ(n),r(z1 +R×q + qZϕ(n)) · D˜Zϕ(n),r(z2 +R×q + qZϕ(n))
.
Due to the invertibility of a1, a2, for any (x1, x2) ∈ a⊥, the elements x1 and
x2 belong to the same ideal JS . Using the inclusion-exclusion principle, we have
D˜Z2ϕ(n),r(z + a
⊥×) =
∑
S⊆{1,··· ,ϕ(n)}
(−1)|S| · D˜Z2ϕ(n),r(z + a⊥(JS)),
D˜Zϕ(n),r(zi+R×q +qZϕ(n)) =
∑
S⊆{1,··· ,ϕ(n)}
(−1)|S| ·D˜Zϕ(n),r(zi+JS),∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
Now we are to estimate D˜Z2ϕ(n),r(z + a
⊥×) by considering each D˜Z2ϕ(n),r(z +
a⊥(JS)) respectively. For the case |S| ≤ ϕ(n), let δ = q−ϕ(n)−bϕ(n)c and m = 2,
then Lemma 13 implies that, for all except a fraction ≤ 32ϕ(n)q−ϕ(n) of a ∈
(R×q )2, ∣∣∣D˜Z2ϕ(n),r(z + a⊥(JS))− q−ϕ(n)−|S|∣∣∣ ≤ 2δ.
For the case |S| > ϕ(n), we can find S′ ⊆ S with |S′| = bϕ(n)c. Because
a⊥(JS) ⊆ a⊥(JS′), we have D˜Z2ϕ(n),r,−z(a⊥(JS)) ≤ D˜Z2ϕ(n),r,−z(a⊥(JS′)). From
the previous result, we conclude that D˜Z2ϕ(n),r,−z(a⊥(JS)) ≤ 2δ+q−ϕ(n)−bϕ(n)c.
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Therefore, the following inequality holds:∣∣∣∣D˜Z2ϕ(n),r(z + a⊥×)− (q − 1)ϕ(n)q2ϕ(n)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
S⊆{1,··· ,ϕ(n)}
(−1)|S| ·
(
D˜Z2ϕ(n),r(z + a
⊥(JS))− q−ϕ(n)−|S|
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤2ϕ(n)+1δ + 2
ϕ(n)∑
k=dϕ(n)e
ϕ(n)
k
 q−ϕ(n)−bϕ(n)c ≤ 2ϕ(n)+2q−ϕ(n)−bϕ(n)c,
for all except a fraction ≤ 64ϕ(n)q−ϕ(n) of a ∈ (R×q )2.
Next, we are to estimate D˜Zϕ(n),r(zi +R×q + qZϕ(n)). Let ∆K be the discri-
minant of the cyclotomic field K = Q[X]/(Φn(X)). As shown in [32], we have
∆K ≤ ϕ(n)ϕ(n). The volume of the ideal lattice σ(JS) is vol(σ(JS)) = N(JS) ·√
∆K and then we have λϕ(n)(σ(JS)) = λ1(σ(JS)) ≤
√
ϕ(n) vol(σ(JS))
1/ϕ(n) ≤
ϕ(n)q|S|/ϕ(n). Let δ = q−ϕ(n)/2. For S of cardinality ≤ ϕ(n)/2, by Lemma 1, we
get that r ≥ ηδ(σ(JS)). Using Lemma 5, we know |D˜Zϕ(n),r,−zi(JS)−q−|S|| ≤ 2δ.
For the case |S| > ϕ(n)/2, using the same argument, we have D˜Zϕ(n),r,−zi(JS) ≤
2δ + q−ϕ(n)/2. Therefore, the following inequality holds:∣∣∣∣D˜Zϕ(n),r(zi +R×q + qZϕ(n))− (q − 1)ϕ(n)qϕ(n)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
S⊆{1,··· ,ϕ(n)}
(−1)|S| ·
(
D˜Zϕ(n),r,−zi(JS)− q−|S|
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤2ϕ(n)+1(δ + q−ϕ(n)/2) = 2ϕ(n)+2q−ϕ(n)/2.
Overall, we prove that, except for a fraction ≤ 64ϕ(n)q−ϕ(n) of a ∈ (R×q )2,
D˜Z2ϕ(n),r(z + a
⊥×) = (1 + δ0) · (q − 1)
ϕ(n)
q2ϕ(n)
,
D˜Zϕ(n),r(zi +R×q + qZϕ(n)) = (1 + δi) ·
(q − 1)ϕ(n)
qϕ(n)
,∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
where |δi| ≤ 22ϕ(n)+2q−bϕ(n)c for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, which implies that |Pra−(q −
1)−ϕ(n)| ≤ ′.
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